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SEEING NAFIA THROUGH THREE LENSES
Ewell, E. Murphy, Jr.*
I. THREE LENSES OF PERCEPTION

Knowledge is a rather destructive thing. Our learning curves are
littered with the wreckage of invalidated hypotheses, discredited concepts, and failed illusions. The more we come to understand an object,
the more we abandon the perspective from which we first glimpsed it.
We are like assiduous astronomers, straining to see stars through a telescope of many lenses, discarding each lens, in turn, to observe more
clearly through the next.
And yet, those discarded lenses serve a useful purpose. We have to
start somewhere. Each of our abandoned perspectives, in turn, enables us
to find another. As Ortega wisely noted, "Sin pre-juicios no cabe
'
formarse juicios."
Without pre-judgements, judgements cannot be
formed. It is discouraging to discard lenses, but with each discarding,
we better visualize the object of our concern.
Looking at NAFrA is like that. In our attempts to understand the
significance of Mexico's joining the free-trade relationship between
Canada and the United States, we lawyers of the United States have
used and discarded two different lenses of perception, and now we are
peering at NAFTA through a third lens. Let us recall how Mexico appeared in those three perceptions, and let us ponder the lessons those
three lenses have taught.
A. The Lens of Economics
The first lens through which U.S. lawyers endeavored to see
Mexico's involvement in NAFTA was economics, the preeminent social
' B.A., LL.B., University of Texas at Austin; D.Phil., Oxford University, England. Mr. Murphy is a retired partner of the law firm of Baker & Botts, L.L.P. in Houston. During the current
academic year, he is a Distinguished Lecturer at the University of Houston Law Center and a
Visiting Professor at the University of Texas Law School.
' Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, Addn en el Para(so, I OBRAS CoMPLETAS 473 (Revista de Occidente, 1966).
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science of the Modem Age. Economics describes human activity in
numbers. It is "GDP this" and "trade balance that" and per capita
quantifications all around. So it was in numbers that the economists
forecast NAFTA to us. For those of us who do not comprehend numbers very well, the economists furnished graphs; export lines and import
lines, zig-zagging in dramatic peaks and valleys. Those graphs were
very effective. They persuaded even the U.S. Congress to back NAFTA.
So it was full speed ahead for NAFTA. Numerically speaking, everything was looking great.
As we lawyers gazed at NAFTA through the lens of economics, it
was reassuring to see who was running Mexico. It was a bunch of
economists. In earlier times, if you wanted to be a President or a cabinet member of a Latin American country, being a general or a lawyer
was the way to go. No longer. Now economists lead the top echelons,
nowhere more than in Mexico. Not just ordinary economists, either, but
Ph.D.s from the most ivoried towers of the Ivy League. So we lawyers
sat back, content that skilled numerologists were authenticating not only
those dramatic graphs, but the numbers they depicted.
Looking through the lens of economics, at first we thought
NAFTA's objective was trade. That is what the Congress was debating,
mostly, and the very name of NAFTA is the "North American Free
Trade Agreement." But once we read beyond the title page, we realized
that NAFTA aimed at much more than trade. It aimed at investment, for
example. In fact, the most perceptive insight into NAFTA was expressed
in two short sentences of The Economist back in 1990, when the
NAFTA negotiations had just begun. Those sentences read: "The freetrade agreement... is not only, or even primarily, about openness of
trade. It has more to do with attracting the foreign investment that Mexico will need."2
That was a very shrewd insight. Its significance rests on Mexico's
historic phobia of foreign investment. In this century that phobia was
notably expressed in the land ownership restrictions of the 1917 Constitution,3 in the oil expropriation of 1938,' and in President Avila
Camacho's 1944 decree limiting foreign ownership in specified industrial
sectors.' It culminated in President Echeverria's protectionist Foreign

2

Mexico: The New Model Debtor, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 86.

' Constitucidn Polfrica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Art. 27.
4 For an historical context of the expropriation, see Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Dilemma of
Hydrocarbon Investment in Mexico's Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 9
J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 261 (1991).
' See Diario Oficial (hereinafter D.O.) July 4, 1944. See also HARRY K. WRIGHT, FOREIGN
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Investment Law of 1973.6 Theologized by the Calvo Doctrine, that phobia kept Mexico from promising, even for such foreign investment as it
deigned to receive, the investment protection commitments of the Con-

vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),7 the Convention creating the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,8 or a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.
Given that phobic tradition, Mexico's undertakings in the foreign
investment provisions of the NAFTA Agreement are remarkable. Besides
fixing sectoral boundaries to state monopoly and to limitations on for-

eign ownership,9 for investment from other NAFTA nations those undertakings grant access to remaining sectors of the Mexican economy"

and promise standards of protection' that more than match the ICSID
Convention and a Bilateral Investment Treaty. In the realm of practicali-

ty, it is difficult to imagine a more dramatic about-turn from the protectionism of the Echeverrian years.
B. The Lens of Law
Evaluating NAFTA's opening of Mexico to foreign investment led
U.S. lawyers to examine the legal system foreign investment would encounter in Mexico, if it entered. That acquainted us with the imposing
infrastructure for domestic and foreign enterprise the Salinas Administration created: a Foreign Investment Law, 2 a Mining Law, 3 commercial

ENTERPRISE iN MEco (University of North Carolina Press, 1971) (describing the regulation of
foreign investment in Mexico prior to the Echeverria Administration, including President Avila
Camacho's original decree and its proliferating amendments).
6 See Ley Para Promover [a Inversidn Mexicana y Regular la Inversidn
Extranjera, D.O.
Mar. 9, 1973. See also Eweli E. Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrian Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign Investment and Licensing in Mexico, 17 TExAS INT'L. LJ. 135 (1982) (analyzing th: provisions).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 5 .LL.M. 1198, Nov. 1966.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 24 I.L.M.
1598, Nov. 1985. MIGA was established as the newest member of the World Bank Group. Its
purpose is to encourage the flow of foreign direct investment to its developing member countries
for economic development. Its primary means of facilitating investment is through the provision
of investment guarantees against the risks of currency transfer, expropriation, and war and civil
disturbance.
9 For Mexico, the limits are stated principally in annexes to NAFTA Chapter 6 and the
Mexican portions of NAFrA Annexes I through VII.
10 See, e.g., NAFTA arts. 1102-1104 (access for investment generally), arts. 1202-1204 (access for cross-border services), and arts. 1405-1406 (access for financial services).
" Id. at arts. 1102-1104 (standards for investment generally), arts. 1202-1204 (standards for
cross-border services), arts. 1405-1406 (standards for financial services).
12 Ley de Inversidn Extranjera, D.O. Dec. 27, 1993; amended, D.O. Dec. 24, 1996. Under
the 1973 enactment the Salinas Administration previously issued liberalizing investment regula-
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arbitration legislation, 4 intellectual property laws,' s and an Economic
Competition Law, 6 all brand-new, enhanced with statutory authorizations for private investment in port services 1" and the generation and
sale of electric power" and topped off, for U.S. investors, with
Mexico's first general income tax treaty with the United States.' 9 Additionally the Salinas Administration continued the privatization of Mexican banks the de la Madrid Administration had started.I As we were
studying that infrastructure the Zedillo Administration embellished it
with a new administrative mechanism for privatizations 2 and with addi-

tional openings in such significant state monopoly sectors as railroad
services,'

tions

telecommunications,'

airport services,24 and the transporta-

(D.O. May 16, 1989), which the 1993 enactment and the 1996 amendment largely left in
place. For a comparison between the 1973 enactment and the 1993 enactment and an analysis of
both in the context of NAFrA, see Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Access and Protection for Foreign
Investment in Mexico under Mexico's New Foreign Investment Law and the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 10 ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LJ. 54 (1995).
" D.O. June 26, 1992; implemented by regulations, D.O. Mar. 29, 1993.
" D.O. July 22, 1993.
's Ley de Fomento y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. June 27, 1991 (implemented by Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. Nov. 23, 1994, Reglamento del
Instituto Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. Nov. 23, 1994) and Decreto por el que se
reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal de Derechos de Autor, D.O. July
17, 1991. For an analysis of these enactments, see John B. McKnight & Carlos Muggenburg
R.V., Mexico's New Intellectual Property Regime: Improvements in the Protection of Industrial
Property, Copyright, License, and Franchise Rights in Mexico, 27 INT'L. LAW. 27 (1993).
6 Ley Federal de Competencia Econdmica, D.O. Dec. 24, 1992.
17 Ley de Puertos, D.O. July 19, 1993; implemented by Reghmento de la Ley de Puertos,
D.O. Nov. 21, 1994.
"BDecreto que reforma, adiciona y deroga diversas disposiciones de la Ley del Servicio
Paiblico de Energla Eldctrica, Dec. 23, 1992; implemented by Resoluci6n general nimero 5 que
establece las reglas para la participacidnde la inversidn extranjera en las actividades del sector
de energia elictrica, que no constituyen servicio pilblico, D.O. Sept. 22, 1993.
9 For reproduced texts of the treaty and accompanying protocol, see TAX TREATmS (CCH),
at 35,801, superseding the former Mexico-U.S. tax agreement, which was limited to income from
shipping and air transport.
" See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Expropriation and Aftermath: The Prospectsfor Foreign Enterprise in the Mexico of Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEXAs INT'L. L.J. 431 (1983); see also Ewell
E. Murphy, Jr., The Mexican Bank Expropriation in Retrospect, 5 MEXICAN FORUM 15 (1985)
(describing the expropriation of the Mexican banks and the beginning of their privatization).
" Acuerdo que crea la Comisi6n Intersecretarialde Desincorporaci6n, D.O. Apr. 7, 1995.
Shares of state-owned entities are sold pursuant to the Ley Federal de las Entidades
Paraestatales, D.O. May 14, 1986. State-owned assets are sold pursuant to the Ley General de
Bienes Nacionales, D.O. Jan. 8, 1982, Feb. 12, 1982, and Mar. 24, 1982.
2 Ley Reglamentaria del Servicio Ferroviario, D.O. May 12, 1995; implemented by
Reglamento del Servicio Ferroviario, D.O. Sept. 30, 1996.
2 Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, D.O. June 7, 1995. The federal government began the
process in 1990 by privatizing the state telephone company, Telifonos de Maxico, SA. de C.V.
(Telmex) and separately transferring state telegraph and satellite services to a new company.
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tion, storage, and distribution of natural gas.' We were quite impressed.
We were so impressed, in fact, that we began to experiment with a
second lens with which to look at NAFTA, the lens of law. Admittedly,
we lawyers found that lens to be more user-friendly. As the lens of
economics describes human activity in numbers, the lens of law describes human activity in words, and we lawyers have always supposed
ourselves to be adept at words. But, aside from its user-friendliness, we
honestly concluded that the lens of law was more revealing of the
NAFTA that we were trying to see, and that when it came to measuring
relationships among the NAFTA nations, numbers were less informative
than the words of national law that made those numbers flow.
Then, as we scanned Mexico's foreign investment infrastructure
through the legal lens, we were taught a startling lesson about the word
"investment" itself. When portfolio investment fled President Zedillo's
bungled devaluation of 1994, we learned that there are investments and
then there are investments, and some are more skittish than others. To
our consternation, some economists seemed as startled as we. That settled it. By the time the U.S. Congress balked at a rescue package for
the peso, and President Clinton dared to devise his own, we had discarded the economic lens completely and we were peering at NAFTA
exclusively through our comfortable new lens of law.
The more we peered through that lens of law, however, the less
sanguine we were of the NAFTA we perceived. What most concerned
us were those industrial sectors that President Zedillo was privatizing.
They are not your ordinary, everyday industries. Virtually every one of
them requires vigilant regulation at both ends, to ensure reasonable
returns to suppliers and fair prices to consumers. To make it more difficult, many of the privatizations involve the unpopular downsizing of
heavily unionized former governmental staff. Of those privatizations, the
most problematical are politically explosive carve-outs from such public
sector icons as Petrdleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and la Comisidn Federal
de Electricidad (C.F.E.). Overseeing such privatized industrial sectors
would be difficult for any nation. For Mexico, which has little governmental experience in impartial and efficient industrial regulation, it will

Telecomunicaciones de Mixico, S.A. de C.V. (Telcom).
Ley de Aeropuertos, D.O. Dec. 22, 1995.
2s Decreto par el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley
Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en el ramo del petrdleo, D.O. May 11, 1995,
amending Ley Reglamentaria del Artculo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo, D.O. Nov.
29, 1958 and Dec. 31, 1958; implemented by Reglamento de Gas Natural, D.O. Nov. 8, 1995.
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be a very formidable task indeed.'
As we pondered those concerns, the birth-rate of Mexican
privatizations abruptly dropped. President Zedillo had successfully accomplished, without inordinate public criticism, significant privatizing
amputations from two sectors of the state energy monopoly: the generation and sale of electric power and the transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas. Then he inserted the presidential scalpel to amputate a third. By executive decree' key petrochemicals were reclassified
from "primary" to "secondary," in order to legalize sales to private
investors, both Mexican and foreign, of majority ownership of groups of
Pemex plants where those petrochemicals are made.
That struck a very sensitive national nerve. Workers demonstrated;
the National Assembly of the ruling political party, el Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (the PRI), passed heated resolutions; committees of the Mexican Congress fumed. Cuauht6moc C~rdenas, the once
and future candidate for the Mexican presidency, thundered that the
proposed plant sale was "a vital part of the plan to re-structure
[Mexico's] mechanisms of production, to subordinate them.., to dominant interests in the government and economy of the United States."'
For privatization of the production of secondary petrochemicals, the
result was a "restructuring" that looked like a retreat.29
Meanwhile criticism of NAFTA by other outspoken Mexicans was
mounting. "The question," Carlos Fuentes muttered, "is how far Mexico
can go in honoring an agreement that fatally favors a strong United
States over a weak neighbor."3
From his knitted ski-mask
Subcomandante Marcos put it more bluntly: "With the signing of
NAFTA, the government of the United States gave its approval for the
assassination of millions of Mexicans."'"
Faced with that troubling scenario, we U.S. lawyers began to under-

The sectors to be privatized are analyzed in N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1995, at Cl.
D.O. Nov. 13, 1996. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Back to the Future? The Prospects for
State Monopoly in Hydrocarbons and Electric Power Under Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, 3 U.S.-MFXco J. 49 (1995), (discussing constitutional limitations on privatizations in
Mexican energy sectors).
28 "[Ulna parte vital del proyecto de reestructuraci6n de nuestros aparatosproductivos, para
subordinarlos . .. a los intereses dominantes en el gobierno y la economia de Estados Unidos".
Cuauhtbmoc Cfrdenas, iNo A LA VENTA DE LA PETROQUIMCA! (Editorial Grijalbo, S.A. de C.V.,
1996), 13-14.
" George Grayson, Worst of All Outcomes for Mexico's Oil Privatization, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 17, 1996, at 4C.
' Carlos Fuentes, Mexico Sees Things Differently, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1996, at 1C.
31 Subcommandante Insurgente Marcos, Fair Warning About What Mexico Will Be
Like In
the 21st Century, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 22, 1995, at 5C.
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stand what we were taught in high school civics, that the viability of
legal rules depends on the cultural will to enforce them. The words of
law do not make the numbers of economics flow unless cultural attitudes cause those words of law to be obeyed. Photogenic numbers and
upbeat graphs do not happen unless the economy they quantify has
order. Trade does not move unless somebody polices the market. Investments do not enter - and portfolio investments do not stay - unless
somebody enforces the warranties and supervises the stock exchange.
And the viability of that policing and enforcing and supervising depends, ultimately, not on words in a statute book, but on a cultural
predisposition to due process and the rule of law. We wondered whether
Mexico could meet that test.
That reminded us that, while President Salinas and President Zedillo
were putting those impressive new words in the statute book, Mexico
appeared to start coming apart at the seams: murdering the archbishop in
Guadalajara; assassinating the Presidential candidate in Tijuana, and the
chief executive of the PRI in Mexico City; an interminable insurrection
in Chiapas; smaller rebellions in Guerrero and other states; killings and
kidnappings galore.
C. The Lens of Culture
We wondered: Is Mexico culturally compatible with the other
NAFTA nations? Are those gringo idioms, "due process" and "the rule
of law," translatable into the pragmatic vocabulary of Mexican politics?
Is the Rio Grande too culturally insurmountable for NAFTA to cross?
For answers to those questions, the lens of law seemed as
unforthcoming as the lens of economics. And so, to see NAFTA yet
more clearly, we U.S. lawyers regretfully discarded our lens of law and
turned to a third lens, the lens of culture.
We discovered that culture is a rather tricky lens to look through.
For one thing, culture does not describe human activity in numbers or
even in words; it describes human activity in feelings - in inarticulate
intuitions about the way people should behave. For another thing, culture is interactive. When you look at NAFTA through the lens of culture, you do not see just the other fellow's culture. You see the cultures
of all three NAFTA nations impinging on each other. That impinging is
very dynamic. Actions from one side of a national border precipitate
reactions - sometimes overreactions - from the other side. In that
sense, to a U.S. observer of NAFTA, the lens of culture is like a mirror
in which you see your own culture flashing back at you. Looking in
that mirror, the U.S. observer soon realizes that the mirror-image of
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one's own culture is not always beautiful.
Look at the frictions between Canada and the United States, for
example. The United States has arraigned Canada before the World
Trade Organization, charging that a Canadian tax on advertisements in
Canadian editions of U.S. magazines is unlawfully discriminatory.3 2 So
far, WTO panels have sustained that charge,33 but the issue cannot be
evaluated without appreciating the annoyance of Canadians at the enormous tides of trash and trivia that come sloshing over their southern
border every day from the U.S. media. That is parallel to the irritation
of Mexicans at the rather blatant non-performance by the United States
of its NAFTA obligation to open border states to Mexican trucks.' Or
consider the accusations brought before NAFTA and the Organization of
American States and recently raised by the European Union at the
World Trade Organization, that the Helms-Burton Act violates international obligations of the United States. 3' To weigh those complaints,
one must understand the anger of Canada, Mexico, and other nations at
secondary boycotts imposed by an economically intrusive Uncle Sam.
And what is the measure of pompous U.S. "decertification" of Mexican
efforts at drug control but the festering, in the United States, of the
largest and most vicious drug market in the world?
II. THE LENSES RECONSIDERED
Mirror-images like that make U.S. lawyers downright gloomy - so
gloomy that now, to tell the truth, we would like to discard our cultural
lens and look at Mexico and NAFTA through a fourth and happier lens.
The trouble is, we cannot find a fourth lens that pictures things as clearly as the three lenses we have already used. Perhaps we should try
putting those three lenses together, and consider contemporary Mexico
as the combined projection of the three separate perspectives the three
lenses reveal.
When we try that combined approach, the lens of economics still
comes up with encouraging numbers. Certainly 1995 was a disaster.
32 Bureau of National Affairs [hereinafter BNA], 13 Int'l. Trade Rep. [hereinafter 1TR] 26,

204 (1996).
33 Canada to Appeal Banning of Tax on Foreign-Owned Magazine Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1997, at C4.
'4 BNA, 13 1TR 43, 102 (1966).
" See Richard English, Opening Moves: The Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of
1996 and the International Response, TFXAS TRANSNAT'L L.Q. 2, Nov. 1996. As of April 11,
1997 the European Union agreed, pending further negotiations with the United States, to suspend
the complaint until October 15, 1997. N.Y. Tam, Apr. 12, 1997, at 1.
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Mexico's sharpest recession in sixty years, the peso forfeiting half its
dollar value;36 2,000,000 Mexicans lost their jobs, leaving forty-four

percent of them below the poverty level. 7 But in 1996 things picked
up: compared to 1995, inflation dropped by nearly half;38 industrial
production increased more than ten percent;39 the Mexican stock exchange regained its 1994 level;' helped by the devalued peso,
Mexico's trade balance surged;4 and GDP growth reversed, from minus

6.2% in 1995 to plus 4% in 1996.42 And to symbolize it all, in January 1997 Mexico paid off the entire .remaining U.S. portion of its peso-

bailout debt.43
To a considerable degree, the legal lens endorses those optimistic
numbers. The impressive new statutes are still on the books, and a 1996
amendment of the Foreign Investment Law further increased access for
foreign enterprise." In net private capital inflows during 1996, Mexico

led all Latin American countries and, among developing countries,
ranked second to the P.R.C.

s

Although the failed sale of majority in-

terests in secondary petrochemical plants may well have marked the end
of really innovative privatizations, now it appears that Mexico will offer
forty-nine-percent interests in the plants for sale in August of 1997.'
36 See Nick Anderson, Mexico Experiences Economic Paradox: Exports Rise, But Other Sectors Stagnant, Hous. CHRON., May 18, 1996, at 4C.
' See Jos6 Maria Imaz & Michael Shellenberger, Mexico's Troubles in One Word? "El
Barzon," Hous. CHRON., May 6, 1996, at 19A.
' See Mexico Drastically Cut Inflation in 1996, HOus. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1997, at 3C.
19 See Mexico's Industrial Output Up, Construction Leads 11% December Rise, Hous.
CHRoN., Feb. 15, 1997, at 2C.
4 See Anthony DePalma, Mexico's Economy Shrinks, But Not As Fast As Before, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 1SA.
4 For twelve-month periods ending in January, Mexico's trade balance increased 8.4% from
January 1995 to January 1996 and 6.2% from January 1996 to January 1997. Financial Indicators, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1996, at 108; FinancialIndicators, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29,
1997, at 116.
42 THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1997, at 106 (OECD statistics).
' See David E. Sanger, Mexico Repays Bailout by U.S. Ahead of Time, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1997, at Al.
Among its innovations are: (1) permitting "pyramidization" by excluding minority foreign
equity in Mexican holding companies from, the calculation of aggregate percentages of foreign
ownership in Mexican companies (Art. 4); (2) increasing from 30% to 49% permitted foreign
ownership in various financial sectors, and allowing, with approval of the Foreign Investment
Commission, more than 49% foreigner ownership in railroad services (Art. 8); and (3) allowing
foreigners to acquire directly land outside the "restricted zone" adjacent to Mexico's land and sea
borders (Art. 10A). (Article references are to the 1993 Foreign Investment Law (D.O. Dec. 27,
1993) as amended by the 1996 enactment (D.O. Dec. 24, 1996).)
0 Finanical Indicators, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1997, at 116 (World Bank statistics). Direct foreign investment in Mexico dropped by approximately $1 billion in 1996 from a record
high of approximately $7 billion in 1995. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at C13.
4 Charles Boisseau, Cross-Border Trade Conference Opens, Mexican Officials Talk of An
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And the maquiladoras4 7 are still flourishing. Toward the end of 1995
there were more than 2,900 of them, hiring more than 742,000 people.' And while in 1986 nearly all maquiladoras were in the border
zone, by 1996 some thirty percent of them were in the interior.'
The cultural lens does not contradict those two optimistic images,
but it colors them darkly with its own. "Sure, the numbers are up and
good laws are on the books," it says, "but how does that help the average Mexican?" The United Nations and the World Bank tell us that,
outside of Africa, Mexico has the biggest gap between rich and poor of
all but six countries in the world. The richest ten percent of Mexicans
control forty-one percent of Mexico's wealth and the poorest fifty percent receive only sixteen percent of national income.' Mexico's recovery from the 1994 collapse cut the living standard of most Mexicans by
twenty percent;5 ' real wages are less than they were in 1981;2 real
GNP has collapsed, per capita, to the level of 1973; and real minimum
wages are seventy percent less than they were then5 And, counting
political as well as economic factors, during the third and fourth quarters of 1996, one respected evaluation ranked Mexico as the riskiest of
major Latin American countries and second only to Russia among rated
countries generally. 4
The significance of those disparities was cogently expressed by
James R. Jones, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico during the
Salinas and Zedillo years. "I think we are living on limited time," he
said. "This generation of adults will probably survive on hope, but I
think over the next five to ten years, if that isn't translated into benefits
and real opportunities, you're going to have demagogues rise up who
55
will want to turn the clock back.

Economy on the Rebound, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1997, at 2C.
, Maquiladoras are industries which are allowed, under certain arrangements in the United
States and Mexico, to import intermediate input, process them in Mexico, and re-export them
back to the United States. See Alejandro Nadal, The Mexican Economic Recovery, 23 CAN.-U.S.
LJ. 59 (1997).
4s See Luis Pazos, PROBLEMAS SOCIOECON6MICOS DE Mfxaco 58 (Editorial Diana, 1996).
See Andrew Downie, New Maquiladoras Not Border-Based, Hous. CHRON., May 9, 1996,
at iC.
" See Anthony DePalma, Income Gap Grows in Mexico, and So Do Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 1996, at 3.
s" See N.Y. TMS, Sept. 25, 1995, at A19.
52 See supra note 50.
5 See Juan Enriquez, Mexico's Cycle of Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at A15.
See Go, Go, Whoa: Brazil's Economy, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1996, at 98; THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 100; New Wisdom About Latin America, Tim ECONOMIST, Mar. 22,
1997, at 130 (citing Economist Intelligence Unit).
" Sam Dillon, Have-Nots Need Stake in Mexico, Envoy Says, N.Y. TIMBS, Dec. 4, 1996, at
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In short, when we lawyers of the United States peer at Mexico's
relationship to the NAFTA through a combination of our three lenses,
we see the numerical optimism of the lens of economics and the verbal
assurance of the lens of law, but also the emotional foreboding of the
lens of culture. Of those three images, none, by itself, captures the full
picture; perhaps, somehow, all three images are correct; conceivably the
three images prefigure a Mexico of strength and stability, but we cannot
be sure. We are only astronomers, not prophets. We have only a telescope to peer through, not a crystal ball. And, when we look at contemporary Mexico through our telescope of three lenses, those are the three
thought-proyoking images that we see.

